China’s interest in the far side of the Moon: scientific, military, or economic?

An illustration of Chang’e-6 on the surface of the lunar farside. (credit: CNSA)

by Carlos Alatorre Monday, April 29, 2024

On January 3, 2019, China achieved the first successful landing on the far side of the Moon with the Chang’e-4 probe. Twelve hours after touching down in the Von Karman Crater near the Moon’s south pole, the accompanying Yutu-2 rover began an exploration of the crater, a region that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had explored before. This achievement was announced, gaining much fanfare within China as the first nation to deliver a probe to the far side.

As announced in a China National Space Administration (CNSA) press release, the Chang’e-4 mission offered three main benefits: scientific discovery through crater exploration, international cooperation through cooperative missions, and a platform for future missions beyond cislunar space. But what is China’s true interest in the far side of the Moon? With the CNSA overseen indirectly by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is an operation of this nature merely a demonstration of military capability or a global announcement of great power status? China’s focus on the far side of the Moon may have elements of diplomatic and military positioning, but evidence suggests its aims are more focused on strategic resource extraction, and the Chang’e missions are the starting gun in a lunar energy race.

After the success of the Chang’e 4 mission, China launched the Chang’e-5 on November 23, 2020, as part of a sample return mission based on the data received by the Yutu-2 rover. Chang’e-5 returned to Earth, landing in Inner Mongolia on December 16 with two kilograms of lunar material. Upon return, the CNSA and the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) jointly announced the discovery of a new mineral, Changesite-(Y). The mineral is a single-crystalline particle that was extracted from the lunar soil thanks to drilling from the Chang’e-5. Li Ziying, chief scientist of lunar sample research at the Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology, claims that the mineral will “help scientists understand the physical traits and history of the Moon.” However, Changesite-(Y) is also attractive for its energy usage. Traces of helium-3, a potential fuel source for nuclear fusion power plants and in limited supply on Earth, were identified in the lunar mineral leading to the CAEA’s interest.

According to the University of Wisconsin’s Fusion Technology Institute, the potential energy output from 40 grams of helium-3 is equivalent to 5,000 tons of coal. There are estimates by Seattle-based company Interlune, a helium-3 harvesting startup, that more than one million tons of helium-3 is the Moon just under the surface. Despite the recent attention that lunar resource exploration has been receiving, Ouyang Ziyuan, director of the CNSA’s Moon exploration program, stated as far back as 2002 that the Moon “could serve as a new and tremendous supplier of energy and resources for human beings…this is crucial to sustainable development of human beings on Earth…whoever first conquers the Moon will benefit first.”

Although China may have been a latecomer to the Apollo-style missions of the 20th century, it has attempted to gain a head start in the lunar energy race with the advent of the Chang’e missions. From a diplomatic and strategic standpoint, it would benefit China to own the narrative that it alone can lead the scientific discovery of new forms of clean energy using sophisticated lunar operations like the Chang’e lander missions or the placement of the Queqiao relay satellite in Lagrange point 2, an admittedly impressive feat used for rover communication that had never been done before.

China isn’t alone in this search for resources. The US, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, and various private firms are all interested in and planning lunar missions for potential resource extraction. According to Namrata Goswami, “China is the only country to articulate a long-term vision of space settlement and utilization. It is the only country to have invested serious money in future space technologies like space-based solar power that will help power such a lunar base.” The lunar base referred to is the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), which will be jointly constructed and operated by China and Russia and placed near the unexplored south pole. The ILRS is being touted as a rival to the US-led Artemis program, which is a new series of manned lunar missions after a 50-year hiatus.

Helium-3 isn’t the only potential power source on the Moon that could fuel a lunar energy race. Frozen water hiding in the craters of the south pole and rare earth elements like scandium and yttrium, used in electronics, could be a gold mine for the nation or company that finds those resources first. Critical minerals and rare earth elements have become necessary for military components and battery construction for the clean-energy transition. After cornering the market in rare earth elements from the purchase of lithium, cobalt, and nickel mines, China has a vested interest in prospecting lunar sites and laying claim to resources discovered. It is unclear how lunar mining rights and territorial claims will work when the UN’s Outer Space Treaty of 1967 forbids any nation from claiming sovereignty of a celestial body. However, without an agreed-upon enforcement mechanism, and China’s recent history of claiming territoriality through first navigation in the South China Sea, the international community may one day see an all-out 49er-style gold rush to the Moon.

Carlos Alatorre is an MA graduate in Statecraft and National Security Affairs from The Institute of World Politics. His research focuses on China’s operational capabilities in orbit and strategic deterrence in cislunar space.

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